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23 member states of the European Union (EU) decided that it was time to fish or
cut bait. On 5 May they signed a plurilateral treaty to scrap all intra-EU bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) in force between them (Termination Agreement).
The timing may seem suspicious as arguments have been made that certain
governmental measures adopted to stem the current Sars-Cov 2 pandemic could
violate investment treaties. However, the Termination Agreement has been long in
the making: in March 2018 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled
in its Achmea judgment that an intra-EU BIT applicable between the Netherlands
and the Slovak Republic violated EU law. In January 2019 the EU member
states declared that all intra-EU BITs violated EU law, were thus inapplicable and
(notwithstanding their alleged inapplicability) should be terminated (for an analysis of
these declarations see here). Last October member states agreed on a draft version
of the plurilateral agreement to terminate intra-EU BITs and now 23 member states
signed the final version of the Termination Agreement. Interestingly, Austria, Ireland,
Finland and Sweden apparently have not yet signed the Termination Agreement,
even though all of them expressed their intention to do so in the 2019 political
declarations (however, it should be noted that Ireland in fact does not have any BIT
at all).
This blog post briefly analyses the implications of the key provisions of the
Termination Agreement on pending and future investment disputes in the European
Union.
BITs and sunset clauses taken out of the equation
The Termination Agreement provides that all intra-EU BITs concluded between
the parties shall be terminated. In addition, all sunset clauses in these BITs and
of those BITs already terminated shall also be ended by virtue of this agreement.
Sunset clauses (also called survival clauses) extend the protection of a BIT for an
investment made prior to the termination of a BIT for a certain period of time after
the termination (e.g. 20 years after the termination in the Estonia-Netherlands BIT).
The terminations of the BITs and the sunset clauses take effect ‘as soon as this
Agreement enters into force for the relevant Contracting Parties’. The agreement
itself will enter into force 30 days after the second ratification and subsequently for
each other party 30 days after it has submitted its instrument of ratification.
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Moreover, as far as newly commenced arbitral proceedings are concerned Article
5 of the Termination Agreement stipulates that the ‘Arbitration Clauses shall not
serve as legal basis for New Arbitration Proceedings’. According to Article 1(6) of
the Termination Agreement any proceedings initiated on or after 6 March 2018 (i.e.
the day the CJEU delivered the Achmea judgment) constitute such ‘New Arbitration
Proceedings’. Any proceedings concluded before 6 March 2018 are not affected
by this agreement (Article 6(1)) and any proceedings already pending on 6 March
2018 are offered the option of a mediated settlement or access to national courts
(Articles 9 and 10). The focus on 6 March 2018 as a reference point stems from an
interpretation that the reasoning of Achmea applies to all intra-EU BITs regardless of
their specific wording (see EU Commission COM(2018) 547 final).
No sunshine when they are gone?
How will investment tribunals react to the Termination Agreement? Hitherto, arbitral
tribunals have followed their long-standing arbitral jurisprudence that EU law
and intra-EU BITs are not in conflict with each other and the BITs could not have
been implicitly terminated by accession to the EU (see e.g. EURAM v. Slovakia).
Any termination of  intra-EU BITs would have to be explicit in accordance with
the applicable rules under international law: the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (VCLT) (see Eureko v. Slovak Republic). Arbitral tribunals have also
stressed that neither Achmea nor the 2019 declarations could have any effect on
their jurisdiction (see e.g. Eskosol v. Italy; United Utilities v. Estonia). After the
termination of the respective BITs new investment arbitration proceedings will
generally be no longer possible. Nonetheless, according to well-established arbitral
case law, pending proceedings are not affected by the termination of a BIT since
states had previously consented to the arbitration through the BIT and cannot
retroactively withdraw that consent once an investor commenced arbitration (so-
called perfected consent) (see e.g. Magyar Farming v. Hungary, para. 214; Marfin v.
Cyprus, para. 593). It would be quite surprising if the Termination Agreement caused
a reversal of that reasoning adopted by investment tribunals (for the irrevocability
of perfected consent see also here and here). The cut-off date for any newly
commenced proceedings will be the actual termination of an intra-EU BIT, not the
day Achmea was published. Thus, the entry into force of the Termination Agreement
for the respective parties of a given BIT is the relevant date. After the termination of
the BIT no consent exists for future investment disputes.
Nonetheless, it remains unresolved whether arbitral tribunals would enjoy jurisdiction
if investors attempted to rely on a sunset clause, which has been mutually
terminated by the parties to an intra-EU BIT. Hitherto, no arbitral tribunal had to rule
on whether it could exercise jurisdiction despite a consensually terminated sunset
provision. Generally, state parties remain the ‘masters of the treaty’, i.e. they can
modify it as they see fit, but must do so explicitly. This follows from Article 70 VCLT:
‘Unless […] the parties otherwise agree, the termination of a treaty […] (b) does
not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created through the
execution of the treaty prior to its termination.’ Hence, the parties to an investment
treaty arguably have the power to remove the sunset clause –and thus the rights that
investors would normally enjoy after the termination of the BIT– if they so agree.
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However, the peculiarity of investment treaties is that the beneficiaries (or even
holders of the rights) are individuals, not states. A removal of the sunset clause
would deprive their investment of international protection on which they may have
relied when making the investment. Accordingly, last November an arbitral tribunal
dealing with an intra-EU investment dispute held that while the state parties ‘remain
the masters of their treaty, their control is limited by the general principles of legal
certainty and res inter alios acta, aliis nec nocet nec prodest’ (a thing done between
others does not harm or benefit others). This was said to be reflected in the sunset
clause ‘[a provision which] shows that, even where the Contracting Parties terminate
the treaty on mutual consent, they acknowledge that long-term interests of investors
who have invested in the host State in reliance on the treaty guarantees must be
respected. This is the purpose served by the 20-year sunset provision’ (Magyar
Farming v. Hungary, paras. 222-223, emphasis added). Such a reasoning seems to
immunise a sunset clause from changes. Conversely, in another intra-EU investment
dispute a tribunal seems to have accepted the possibility of removing the sunset
clause of a BIT holding that: ‘As is undisputed, neither Hungary nor France has
made any attempt to renegotiate, modify, or shorten the relevant “survival” period.
Accordingly, […] the Tribunal would still have jurisdiction to hear this case.’ (UP and
C.D. Holding v. Hungary, para. 265).
These apparently contradictory observations only take us so far. Ultimately, much
will depend on the wording of the sunset clause. Some sunset clauses indicate that
they are only applicable to unilateral termination of treaties (e.g. Article 16 Czech
Republic-Denmark BIT). The language of most of these clauses, however, does
not reveal whether only unilateral or also mutual termination is covered, and the
tribunal will be required to carefully assess the arguments presented. In the abstract,
it seems reasonable for a tribunal to accept jurisdiction over disputes involving
investments made prior to the consensual termination of a sunset clause because
a sudden withdrawal of the rights guaranteed to already established investments
contravenes legal security and legal certainty – principles which are arguably the
raison d’être of investment treaties.
Another unresolved debate could play an important role in this regard, namely
the nature of investors’ rights. Do investment treaties directly confer rights upon
investors, i.e. do these rights exist independently of the state parties’ rights (see
e.g. Corn Products v. Mexico)? Or are these rights merely derivative, i.e. rights that
are only owed to the state party of the BIT, but investors are permitted to enforce
these rights (see e.g. ADM v. Mexico)? If investment treaties directly confer rights
to investors, even a mutual termination of a sunset clause should not bar a tribunal
from hearing investment disputes.
Conclusion
On the one hand, the Termination Agreement finally settles the question whether
intra-EU BITs will exist for much longer: they will not. On the other hand, the
Termination Agreement still contributes to the clash between EU law and intra-EU
investment arbitration. The attempts at having the Termination Agreement apply
partially retroactively to pending arbitral proceedings should leave arbitral tribunals
unimpressed when ruling on jurisdiction. The more controversial jurisdictional topic
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is the mutual termination of sunset clauses. It remains to be seen if any investor will
risk initiating arbitral proceedings after an intra-BIT has been scrapped together with
the sunset clause, but any such dispute would certainly result in a clarification of the
powers of the ‘masters of the treaties’.
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